Games Played in a Contracting Environment
AbstractWe analyze situations where a player must contract with the monopoly supplier of an essential input in order to play an action in a strategic form game. Supplier monopoly power does not distort the equilibrium distribution over player actions under private contracting, but may dramatically affect the equilibrium actions under public contracting. When \ a player randomizes between actions, suppliers for the different actions behave as though they are producing perfect substitutes when contracts are private; when contracts are public, it is as though they are producing perfect complements.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 583.
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-21 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987.
"Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules,"
Economics Working Papers
8756, University of California at Berkeley.
- Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Ziss, Steffen, 1997. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 231-35, March.
- Fershtman, C. & Kalai, E., 1993.
10-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1995. "Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1421-43, November.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
- Levent Kockese & Efe A. Ok, 2002.
"Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts,"
0102-26, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424, 04.
- Kockesen, L. & Ok, E., 1999. "Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 99-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, B & Picard, P, 1995.
"Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 621-46, May.
- Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno & Picard Pierre, 1991. "Competing vertical structures : precommitment and renegotiation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9125, CEPREMAP.
- Baye, Michael R. & Morgan, John, 1999. "A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 59-65, October.
- McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd & Ehud Kalai, 1990.
"Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation,"
879, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August.
- V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Andrea Prat & Aldo Rustichini, 2003.
"Games Played Through Agents,"
Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 989-1026, 07.
- Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-44, May.
- Michael L. Katz, 1991.
"Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
- Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economics Working Papers 91-172, University of California at Berkeley.
- Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Essex Economics Web Manager).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.