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The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach

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Pierre Regibeau ()
Katharine Rockett ()

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Abstract

This paper presents an economic analysis of the relationship between Intellectual Property (IP) Law and Competition Law. Contrary to some of the recent debate, our analysis emphasises the separation of IP Law and Competition Law: IP law should concern itself with assigning and defending intellectual property rights, while Competition Law should concern itself with the use of those rights. This separation extends to the enforcement of the law as well, where we argue that once property rights have been assigned, no further distinction based on intellectual or non-intellectual property should be made. While the IP/Competition Law interface has some specificity due to the types of behaviours that tend to arise more frequently where IP is concerned, we argue for a set of principles for Competition Policy that include restraint, a commitment not to revisit ex post the rights granted by IP law, and a commitment to make large changes in property right regimes only when very large changes in ex post regulation occur.

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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 581.

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Date of creation: 18 Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:581

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dieter Schmidtchen, . "Die Beziehung zwischen dem Wettbewerbsrecht und dem Recht geistigen Eigentums - Konflikt, Harmonie oder Arbeitsteilung? - The Relationship between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Law - Conflic," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1164, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
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