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Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket

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V. Bhaskar ()

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Abstract

In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision is assigned via a coin toss. We utilize these "randomized trials" to examine (a) the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences, and (b) the treatment effects of chosen actions. We find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are often poorly made since they reduce the probability of the team winning.

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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 578.

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Date of creation: 08 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:578

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  1. Luis Garicano & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Canice Prendergast, 2001. "Favoritism Under Social Pressure," Working Papers 2001-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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  2. Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2002. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1594-1605, December. [Downloadable!]
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  3. P.-A. Chiappori & S. Levitt & T. Groseclose, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September. [Downloadable!]
  4. David Romer, 2002. "It's Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say? A Dynamic Programming Analysis of Football Strategy," NBER Working Papers 9024, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2001. "Professionals Play Minimax," Working Papers 2001-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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  6. Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001. "Minimax Play at Wimbledon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-24, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Heckman, James J. & Lalonde, Robert J. & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1999. "The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1865-2097 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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