Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?

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Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?

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P. Regibeau ()
K. Rockett ()

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Abstract

Innovative activities often are heavily regulated. Reviews conducted by administrative agencies take time and are not perfectly accurate. Of particular concern is whether, by design or not, such agencies discriminate against more important innovations by taking more time to perform their reviews. We study the relationship between the length of patent review and the importance of inventions in a theoretical model. We find that, controlling for the importance of innovations, the welfare-maximising patent approval delay decreases over time. Second, controlling for a patent's position in the new technology cycle, the optimal examination time decreases with the importance of patents. We test our predictions on US GM crop patent data from 1988 to 1998. The evidence supports the predictions of the theoretical model.

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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 556.

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Date of creation: 28 Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:556

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Paper
- Régibeau, Pierre & Rockett, Katharine, 2007. "Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-IND-2003-07-10 (Industrial Organization)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Ricardo J. Caballero & Adam B. Jaffe, 1993. "How High are the Giants' Shoulders: An Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Stefan, 2005. "Modelling the duration of patent examination at the European Patent Office," CEPR Discussion Papers 5283, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dietmar Harhoff & Stefan Wagner, 2006. "Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office," Discussion Papers 170, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Stefan, 2006. "Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 1256, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
David Dranove & David Meltzer, 1994. "Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 402-423, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1999. "The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators," NBER Working Papers 7345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Johnson, Daniel K N & Popp, David, 2003. " Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 96-112, Spring.
Other versions:
- Daniel K.N. Johnson & David Popp, 2001. "Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 8374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Manuel Trajtenberg, 1990. "A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 172-187, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 2004. "Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 441-465, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Stefan, 2005. "Modelling the duration of patent examination at the European Patent Office," CEPR Discussion Papers 5283, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dietmar Harhoff & Stefan Wagner, 2006. "Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office," Discussion Papers 170, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Stefan, 2006. "Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 1256, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
M. Conti & P. Regibeau & K. Rockett, 2003. "How Basic is (Patented) University Research? The Case of GM Crops," Economics Discussion Papers 558, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Schneider, Cédric, 2007. "The Outcome of Patent Applications - Does Experience Matter?," MPRA Paper 3359, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2005. "Competition, Regulation, and Intellectual Property Management in Genetically Modified Foods: Evidence from Survey Data," Economics Discussion Papers 591, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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