Strategy proof mechanisms for cost sharing
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 520.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
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- Salvador Barberà, 2010.
"Strategy-proof social choice,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Mutuswami, Suresh, 2005. "Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-88, October.
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