This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Abhinay Muthoo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 420.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:420

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Wivenhoe Park, COLCHESTER. CO4 3SQ
Phone: +44-1206-872728
Fax: +44-1206-872724
Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Discussion Papers Administrator, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, U.K.
Email:
Web: http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/discussion-papers/papers-request.shtm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (R. E. Bailey).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  4. Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. Helmut Bester & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation," ESE Discussion Papers 61, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Segendorff, Björn, 2001. "Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 461, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gueth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & Damme, E. van, 2002. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," Working Papers 2006-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Camera, Gabriele & Selcuk, Cemil, 2006. "Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1190, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "War or Peace," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1052-1052. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav & Daniel Quint, 2004. "Multilateral Bargaining With Concession Costs," Working Papers wp2004_0415, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-10.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.