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Union-Firm Bargaining Under Alternative Pay Schemes: Does Performance Related Pay Fair Better?

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  • Rupayan Pal

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    Abstract

    This paper compares and contrasts equilibrium outcomes under right-to-manage bargaining (RTM) and efficient bargaining (EB) corresponding to two alternative pay schemes, fixed wage vis-a-vis piece-rate. [WP No.8]. URL:[http://www.gipe.ac.in/pdfs/working%20papers/wp8.pdf].

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:3803.

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    Date of creation: Mar 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3803

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    Web page: http://www.esocialsciences.org

    Related research

    Keywords: equilibrium; RTM; Efficient bargaining; EB; alternative pay; fixed wage; union; firm; Bargaining; piece-rate; Social welfare; Union; output; payoff; manufacturing; firms; pune; India;

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    1. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534, 04.
    2. Emmanuel Petrakis & Minas Vlassis, . "Endogenous Wage-Bargaining Institutions in Oligopolistic Sectors," Working Papers, University of Crete, Department of Economics 0105, University of Crete, Department of Economics, revised 00 Dec 2001.
    3. Booth,Alison L., 1994. "The Economics of the Trade Union," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521464673.
    4. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Performance Pay and Productivity," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bhattacherjee, Debashish, 2003. "The Effects of Group Incentives in an Indian Firm - Evidence from Payroll Data," Working Papers, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics 03-14, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    6. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "Optimal Intervention in an Economy with Trade Unions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 221, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    7. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    8. Kraft, Kornelius, 1998. "The codetermined firm in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 195-201, November.
    9. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "Trade Unions, Wages and Unemployment: What Can Simple Models Tell Us?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 526-45, November.
    10. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
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