IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id1941.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Technology Adoption in a Differentiated Duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand

Author

Listed:
  • Rupayan Pal

Abstract

This paper compares equilibrium technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly under two alternative modes of product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. It shows that the cost of technology has differential impact on technology adoption, that is, on cost-efficiency of the industry, under two alternative modes of product market competition. The possibility of ex post cost asymmetry between firms is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If the cost of technology is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost-efficiency than Cournot competition provided that the cost reducing effect of the technology is high. On the other hand, if the technology reduces the marginal cost of production by a very low amount, Cournot competition may lead to higher cost-efficiency than Bertrand competition.[IGIDR WP NO 1]

Suggested Citation

  • Rupayan Pal, 2009. "Technology Adoption in a Differentiated Duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand," Working Papers id:1941, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1941
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.eSocialSciences.com/data/articles/Document11452009240.5832788.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Delbono, Flavio & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1990. "R & D investment in a symmetric and homogeneous oligopol : Bertrand vs Cournot," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 297-313, June.
    2. Bonanno, Giacomo & Haworth, Barry, 1998. "Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 495-510, July.
    3. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:6:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2006. "Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 999-1015, December.
    6. Amir, Rabah & Jin, Jim Y., 2001. "Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 303-317, March.
    7. Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1993. "The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 519-534.
    8. Hikaru Ogawa & Ming Hsin Lin, 2005. "Cost reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(6), pages 1-6.
    9. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    10. Boone, Jan, 2001. "Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 705-726, April.
    11. Aghion, Philippe & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1997. "Competition and growth with step-by-step innovation: An example," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 771-782, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pal, Rupayan, 2010. "Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 128-136, June.
    2. Yannis Kerkemezos & Bas Karreman, 2020. "On the Benefits of Being Alone: Scheduling Changes, Intensity of Competition and Dynamic Airline Pricing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-042/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Daniela Grieco, 2007. "Degree of Innovativeness and Market Structure: A Model," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(2), pages 7-27, May.
    4. Paul Belleflamme & Cecilia Vergari, 2011. "Incentives To Innovate In Oligopolies," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 6-28, January.
    5. Tishler, Asher & Milstein, Irena, 2009. "R&D wars and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 519-531, July.
    6. Piercarlo Zanchettin & Vincenzo Denicolò, 2004. "Competition and Growth in Neo-Schumpeterian Models," Discussion Papers in Economics 04/28, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    7. Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, 2015. "Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 696-732, December.
    8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Competition And Welfare: The Implications Of Licensing," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(1), pages 20-40, January.
    9. Gilbert Richard J, 2006. "Competition and Innovation," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-23, December.
    10. Jurgan, Jens, 2009. "Conjectural cost variations in a differentiated good oligopoly," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 80, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    11. Ming Chang & Yan-Ching Ho, 2014. "Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(2), pages 133-174, October.
    12. Spulber, Daniel F., 2012. "Tacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 641-653.
    13. Jens Jurgan, 2009. "Cost Variations in a Differentiated Good Oligopoly," Working Papers 069, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    14. Toshihiro Uchida & Paul Ferraro, 2007. "Voluntary development of environmental management systems: motivations and regulatory implications," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 37-65, August.
    15. Mingdi Xin & Vidyanand Choudhary, 2019. "IT Investment Under Competition: The Role of Implementation Failure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1909-1925, April.
    16. Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2006. "Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 999-1015, December.
    17. Pia Weiss, 2003. "Adoption of Product and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets: The Impact of Competition," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(3_4), pages 301-314, December.
    18. Claude d'Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2007. "Competition For Market Share Or For Market Size: Oligopolistic Equilibria With Varying Competitive Toughness," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 761-784, August.
    19. Claude D'Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Louis‐André Gérard‐Varet, 2010. "Strategic R&D investment, competitive toughness and growth," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 273-295, September.
    20. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2005. "Price and quantity competition under free entry," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 335-344, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differentiated duopoly; limit-pricing; price effect; selection effect; technology adoption; cournot; bertrand;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1941. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Padma Prakash (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.esocialsciences.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.