Gestational Surrogacy Contracts: Altruistic or Commercial ?
AbstractThe paper provides an analytical structure to endogenize the optimal gestational surrogacy contract in terms of a simple moral hazard framework. The study shows that altruistic surrogacy is optimal only if the surrogate has lower outside option and is sufficiently altruistic. Otherwise commercial surrogacy is optimal. We also show that for lower outside option greater social ignominy makes the surrogacy contract relatively more altruistic but the reverse happens when the surrogate has higher outside option. The author explores alternative model specifications and find a case where commercial surrogacy is always optimal irrespective of altruism, outside option and social ignominy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:1811.
Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Intended parents; reproduction; parenthood; child; children; India; altruism; cultural; traditional; ethical; legal; economic; mother; wife; sociological Social ignominy.Commercial surrogacy contracts; Altruistic surrogacy contracts; Surrogate;
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