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The Unsupportable Support Price: The Government in Paddy Auctions of Northern India

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Author Info
Meenakshi J V ()
Abstract

The present paper studies a regulated market for parmal paddy in the state of Haryana in North India, with a view to address several objectives. To analyse many questions, simple models of open, ascending auctions are analysed. Although many lots of parmal are auctioned each day, they are extremely heterogeneous in quality. On any given day, we rarely observe several lots of identical quality being sold. Therefore the theory of auctions of a single object is used as a framework for analysis. [CDE WP 94].

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Paper provided by esocialsciences.com in its series Working Papers with number id:1212.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1212

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Related research
Keywords: paddy; Haryana; theory of auctions; north india; auction; market; rice; conversion factor; government; regulated market; collusion; price formation;

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  1. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Skrzypacz, A. & Hopenhayn, H., 1999. "Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions," RCER Working Papers 463, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
  4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-24.

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