Cooperation in social dilemmas: The necessity of seeing self-control conflict
AbstractIndividuals in a social dilemma may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and their better judgment to cooperate. Pairing a public goods game with a subtle framing technique, we test whether perception of self-control conflict strengthens the association between self-control and cooperation. Consistent with our hypothesis, cooperative behavior is positively associated with self-control for individuals in the treatment that raised the relative likelihood of perceiving conflict, but not associated with self-control in the treatment that lowered the likelihood. These results help advance our understanding of the role of self-control in social interaction.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESMT European School of Management and Technology in its series ESMT Research Working Papers with number ESMT-10-004 (R1).
Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: 26 Jul 2010
Date of revision: 16 Nov 2012
self-control; pro-social behavior; public good experiment; conditional cooperation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-08-06 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-08-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2010-08-06 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-PBE-2010-08-06 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-08-06 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kristian Ove R. Myrseth & Gerhard Riener & Conny Wollbrant, 2013.
"Tangible temptation in the social dilemma: Cash, cooperation, and self-control,"
ESMT Research Working Papers
ESMT-13-04, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
- Myrseth, Kristian Ove R. & Riener, Gerhard & Wollbrant, Conny, 2013. "Tangible Temptation in the Social Dilemma: Cash, cooperation, and self-control," Working Papers in Economics 567, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Daniel Houser & Natalia Montinari & Marco Piovesan, 2012. "Private and Public Decisions in Social Dilemmas: Evidence from ChildrenÕs Behavior," Working Papers 1034, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Martin G. Kocher & Peter Martinsson & Kristian Ove R. Myrseth & Conny Wollbrant, 2013.
"Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4200, CESifo Group Munich.
- Martin G. Kocher & Peter Martinsson & Kristian Ove R. Myrseth & Conny Wollbrant, 2012. "Strong, bold, and kind: Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-12-01 (R1), ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 28 Mar 2013.
- Kocher, Martin G. & Martinsson, Peter & Myrseth, Kristian Ove R. & Wollbrant, Conny, 2012. "Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Discussion Papers in Economics 12706, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Kocher, Martin G. & Martinsson, Peter & Myrseth, Kristian Ove R. & Wollbrant, Conny, 2012. "Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Working Papers in Economics 523, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ESMT Faculty Publications).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.