Rainer Nitsche (ESMT European School of Management and Technology) Lars Wiethaus (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)
Abstract
This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long-run-incremental cost regulation. Risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, long-run-incremental costs and regulatory holiday, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by ESMT European School of Management and Technology in its series ESMT Research Working Papers with number
ESMT-09-003.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: