Evolving Preferences and Policy Advice in Democratic Society
AbstractThe theoretical consistency and practical applicability of traditional welfare economics has long been subject to controversy. More recently the challenge has been added from evolutionary approaches that the individual preferences on which the welfare calculus is based are themselves subject to change. The purpose of the present paper is twofold. It takes, firstly, a closer look at the discussion on the need and feasibility of an evolutionary welfare economics that accommodates evolving preferences. The particular focus is on proposal advanced by three authors, Carl Christian von WeizsÃ¤cker, Ulrich Witt and Robert Sugden. And it seeks, secondly, to show that the constitutional economics paradigm can deal with the evolving-preferences-issue in a more coherent and consistent way than approaches that remain within the mind-frame of welfare economics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2009-19.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-01-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-01-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Ulrich Witt & Christian Schubert, 2008.
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Constitutional Political Economy,
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- U. Witt & C. Schubert, 2008. "Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How Much Do We Need to Know about Risk Preferences?," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
- Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 23-49, June.
- Viktor J. Vanberg, 2008. "The Economics of Moral Preferences," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 605-628, October.
- Ulrich Witt, 2003. "Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 77-94, 04.
- Safarzyńska, Karolina, 2013. "Evolutionary-economic policies for sustainable consumption," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 187-195.
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