The Political Economy of Infrastructure Investment in India
AbstractWe construct a simple political economy model with imperfect capital markets to explain infrastructure investments across Indian states. The model predicts that: i) the fixed cost of accessing the modern sector, ii) the initial stock of infrastructure, iii) median voter wealth, and iv) corruption, can all potentially explain why different states have different level of infrastructure investments. The theoretical model is motivated by recent empirical work on India that argues that there as on why per capita income across Indian states have diverged is because of the distribution of infrastructure investments. The model suggests that reducing leakages in funds earmarked for infrastructure and reducing the ?xed costs of accessing the modern sector - beyond their other well known effects - are policy complements. Together, they can incentivize politicians to spend more on infrastructure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy Group in its series Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy with number 2007-07.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2007-02-17 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-DEV-2007-02-17 (Development)
- NEP-MAC-2007-02-17 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2007-02-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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