The Consistency Axiom - An Experimental Study -
AbstractIf a strict equilibrium is suggested as the solution of a strategic game in normal form and if some but not all players are committed to their solution strategy, a reduced game results with only the still non-committed as active players. The reduced game property (or consistency axiom) demands that the solution of the reduced game is given by the original solution strategies of its active players. However, postulating the reduced game property is asking for too much: consistent equilibrium selection in general is not possible if certain other requirements (existence and optimality) are granted (Norde et al., 1996). Does the reduced game property have at least some behavioral appeal? We test this experimentally by confronting players with a solution proposal before letting them decide both for the original game and for its reduced games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2004-25.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
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- Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 1996.
"Equilibrium selection and consistency,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3813, Maastricht University.
- Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
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