Rotation schemes in politics - An experimental examination
AbstractRotation schemes in political organizations imply the temporary exclusion of some organization’s members (outsiders) from decision-making. Consequently, only a fraction of members (insiders) has a direct influence in the decision-making process, whose results, however, concern and affect all members of the organization. Even though rotation schemes have been implemented in some political organizations – and are about to become more important in the European Union in the course of future enlargements – the political and economic consequences of rotation schemes, compared to an encompassing representation system, have not been thoroughly studied. We examine the effects of rotation schemes on the provision of a public good in groups. In particular, we study the degree of cooperation of (rotating) insiders and outsiders in an experiment and compare cooperation in rotation schemes with cooperation levels without rotation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2003-26.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Verena Waldner & Martin Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "Rotation Schemes In Politics - An Experimental Examination," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 38, Royal Economic Society.
- NEP-ALL-2003-11-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-11-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2003-11-30 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2003-11-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Ronald Bosman & Philipp Maier & Vijollca Sadiraj & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of the Effects of Vote Rotation in Committees," DNB Working Papers 023, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
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