Tax evasion and state productivity – An experimental study

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Tax evasion and state productivity – An experimental study

Author Info

Werner Güth
Sabine Strauß
Matthias Sutter

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In an overlapping generations-experiment with multiple families participants can either support their parents directly and thereby reduce their tax burden or hope for tax-financed old age support. State productivity is captured by the factor with which total tax revenues are multiplied to determine old age support. This factor is systematically varied from 0.75 to 1.25. Tax payments depend in declared endowment. Tax evasion is possible, but monitored. Surprisingly state productivity influences neither direct support of own parents nor tax evasion. The main effect is that rich endowment triggers relatively low support of own parents and high (and more frequent) tax evasion.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2002-37.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-37

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena
Phone: +49-3641-68 65
Fax: +49-3641-68 69 90
Web page: http://www.econ.mpg.de/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.econ.mpg.de/english/research/ESI/discuss.php

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Karin Richter).

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Werner Güth & Sabine Strauß & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "Tax Evasion And State Productivity-An Experimental Study," Metroeconomica, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(1), pages 85-100, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael, 1992. "Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1018-26, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gueth, W. & Sutter, M. & Verbon, H. & Weck-Hannemann, H., 2001. "Family versus public solidarity : theory and experiment," Discussion Paper 86, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
D. Engelmann & M. Strobel, . "The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1999-66, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
Other versions:
- Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2000. "The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 241-260, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H & Schulze, William D, 1999. "Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 141-71.
Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.