Tax evasion and state productivity – An experimental study
AbstractIn an overlapping generations-experiment with multiple families participants can either support their parents directly and thereby reduce their tax burden or hope for tax-financed old age support. State productivity is captured by the factor with which total tax revenues are multiplied to determine old age support. This factor is systematically varied from 0.75 to 1.25. Tax payments depend in declared endowment. Tax evasion is possible, but monitored. Surprisingly state productivity influences neither direct support of own parents nor tax evasion. The main effect is that rich endowment triggers relatively low support of own parents and high (and more frequent) tax evasion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2002-37.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Werner Güth & Sabine Strauß & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "Tax Evasion And State Productivity-An Experimental Study," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 85-100, 02.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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