I will survive! -- Gender discrimination in a household saving decisions experiment
AbstractWe investigate the gender specific intertemporal allocation behavior of spouses with different deterministic life expectations in an experiment where the gen- der of one's partner is known. In each period of their life both partners propose a consumption level one of which is then randomly implemented. To allow for learning one experiences many "lives". Participants achieve a rather high degree of optimality that does not change over time. Indepen- dent of the own gender a participant is nicer to women and acts more selfishly if the partner is a man. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2002-14.
Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2002-08-16 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-EXP-2002-08-16 (Experimental Economics)
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