The paper develops an equilibrium model of the marriage market with two important features. There are matching frictions, and women in the marriage market face different choices than men. When a man and women meet, the man can choose to marry the woman, or not, if she will have him. In addition to this choice, a woman can also choose to have a child by the man and then raise it without the father. A number of equilibria are shown to exist. In one of these, only women with 'poorer marriage prospects' have children outside marriage. Furthermore, an equilibrium with only the 'more desirable' women having children outside marriage does not exist.
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Paper provided by Institute for Social and Economic Research in its series ISER working papers with number
2002-30.
Length: 34 Date of creation: Dec 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ese:iserwp:2002-30
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