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Performance Related Pay

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Author Info
Alison L. Booth () (Department of Economics, University of Essex)
Marco Francesconi () (Department of Economics, University of Essex)

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Abstract

The paper extends the theoretical approach in Lazear (1986, 1996) to show that jobs with performance related pay (PRP) attract workers of higher unobservable ability, and also induce workers to provide greater effort. We then test some of the predictions of this model against data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), using earnings as a proxy for productivity. Our estimated earnings equations show that PRP raises wages by about 9% for men and 6% for women over the entire (union and nonunion) sample.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Social and Economic Research in its series ISER working papers with number 1996-14.

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Date of creation: Sep 1996
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Handle: RePEc:ese:iserwp:1996-14

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Postal: Publications Office, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ UK
Phone: 44-1206-872957
Fax: 44-1206-873151
Web page: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/

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Postal: Publications Office, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ UK
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  1. Felipe Balmaceda, 2002. "Compensation Methods in a Competitive Labor Market: the Role of Asymmetric Information," Documentos de Trabajo 139, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gielen, A. C., 2007. "Performance Pay, Training and Labor Mobility," Discussion Paper 2007-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Antti Kauhanen & Hannu Piekkola, 2002. "Profit Sharing in Finland: Earnings and Productivity Effects," Discussion Papers 817, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. repec:ese:iserwp: is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Post-Print halshs-00179979_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. S Fernie & D Metcalf, 1998. "(Not)Hanging on the Telephone: Payment systems in the New Sweatshops," CEP Discussion Papers 0390, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  7. W.D. McCausland & K. Pouliakas & I. Theodossiou, 2005. "Some are Punished and Some are Rewarded: A Study of the Impact of Performance Pay on Job Satisfaction," Labor and Demography 0505019, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 1997. "On the Elasticity of Effort for Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-31, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Erling Barth, Bernt Bratsberg, Torbjørn Hægeland and Oddbjørn Raaum, 2008. "Performance Pay and Within-Firm Wage Inequality," Discussion Papers 535, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
  11. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2004. "Confronting Objections to Performance Pay: A Study of the Impact of Individual and Gain-sharing Incentives on the Job Satisfaction of British Employees," MPRA Paper 1629, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  12. Felipe Balmaceda, . "Compensation Methods in Competitive Labor Markert," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv118, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  13. Felipe Balmaceda, 2004. "Uncertainty, Pay for Performance and Adverse Selection in a Competitive Labor Market," Documentos de Trabajo 196, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  14. Cowling, Marc, 2007. "Performance Related Pay Coverage in the UK," MPRA Paper 1619, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Tuomas Pekkarinen & Chris Riddell, 2006. "Performance Pay and Earnings: Evidence from Personnel Records," IZA Discussion Papers 2253, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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