How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
AbstractIn this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in di.erent categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research in its series IESA Working Papers Series with number 0407.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
prisoners’ dilemma; payment cards; social conflict.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2004-06-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2004-06-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-06-02 (Regulation)
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