Beyond Federalism - Estimating and Explaining the Territorial Structure of Government
AbstractThis paper suggests that the basic distinction between federal and unitary government has limited as well as served our understanding of government. The notion that variation in the structure of government is a difference of kind rather than degree has straight-jacketed attempts to estimate the authority of intermediate government. One result has been the claim that a country’s footprint, not its population, is decisive for government. Analyzing data for 39 countries since 1950, and comparing our own findings with those of alternative measurements, we find evidence for the causal effect of population. This can be theorized in terms of a trade-off between responsiveness to soft information and per capita economies in public good provision.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University Berlin in its series KFG Working Papers with number p0037.
Date of creation: 13 Apr 2012
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Web page: http://www.transformeurope.eu/
integration theory; governance;
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