This paper sets out to explore the puzzle of possible institutionalization or reversal of rules 'imported' by new member states from Central and Eastern Europe during their preparation for accession to the EU. It argues that the institutionalization of formal rules adopted as part of enlargement requirements is not automatic post accession. New formal rules can be reversed, supported by secondary rules and institutionalized or ignored and not implemented. The paper proposes a politics framework that suggests that these different outcomes will be influenced by the environment of weak post communist states and will depend on the area specific configuration of formal and informal veto players and on the EU's ability to impose sanctions. In the case of non acquis imported rules, reversal of formal rules would be possible without sanctions whereas in the case of acquis rules, the likely outcomes are institutionalization or 'empty shells'. Another outcome, 'capture' of the new rules is likely in areas with distributive implications.
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Paper provided by European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS) in its series EUI-RSCAS Working Papers with number
37.
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