Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus: The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gros, Daniel

Abstract

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB%20No%20289%20DG%20BU%20with%20a%20Sovereign%20Virus.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for European Policy Studies in its series CEPS Papers with number 7904.

as in new window
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7904

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Place du Congrès, B-1000 Bruxelles
Phone: (+322) 229-39-11
Fax: (+322) 229-39-71
Email:
Web page: http://www.ceps.eu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gianluca Cafiso, 2013. "Public-Debt Financing in the case of External Debt," Working Papers 2013-37, CEPII research center.
  2. Paolo Angelini & Giuseppe Grande & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 213, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  3. Fritz Breuss, 2013. "European Banking Union," WIFO Working Papers 454, WIFO.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7904. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Margarita Minkova).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.