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A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update

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  • Schoenmaker, Dirk
  • Gros, Daniel

Abstract

Cross-border firms supply goods and services throughout Europe and cross-border banks facilitate the cross-border traffic by persons and firms. European banks are thus an integral part of the internal market. Yet cross-border banking is not stable in the current institutional setting as national authorities focus on preserving the national parts of a cross-border bank and the integrated value of a bank is neglected. European banks therefore need a European safety net, which is a precondition for putting the supervisory framework on a European footing. This Policy Brief first shows the overall architecture for a banking union in the euro area and sketches the basic building blocks of such a safety net. Next, it provides a sketch of a prospective European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund and outlines how one could structure a gradual transition from the national deposit insurance funds to the new European fund. Finally, it calculates that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about �30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7684, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7684
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7276, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    2. Maylis Avaro & Henri Sterdyniak, 2014. "Banking union: a solution to the euro zone crisis?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 193-241.
    3. Iain Begg, 2012. "Banking Union: Inevitable, But Profoundly Challenging?," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 15-20, December.
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    5. Marius A. Zoican & Lucyna A. Górnicka, 2013. "Banking Unions: Distorted Incentives and Efficient Bank Resolution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-184/VI, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 May 2014.
    6. Paola Leone & Pasqualina Porretta & Luca Riccetti, 2021. "European Significant Bank Stock Market Volatility: Is there a Bail-In Effect?," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 14(5), pages 1-32, July.
    7. Górnicka, Lucyna A. & Zoican, Marius A., 2016. "Too-international-to-fail? Supranational bank resolution and market discipline," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 41-58.
    8. Marius Andrei Zoican & Lucyna Anna Gornicka, 2014. "Banking Union Optimal Design under Moral Hazard," 2014 Papers pzo33, Job Market Papers.
    9. Fritz Breuss, 2013. "European Banking Union," WIFO Working Papers 454, WIFO.
    10. Benczur, Peter & Cannas, Giuseppina & Cariboni, Jessica & Di Girolamo, Francesca & Maccaferri, Sara & Petracco Giudici, Marco, 2017. "Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell to bail-out?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 207-223.

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