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Reducing Waste With an Efficient Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit

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  • Dean Baker

Abstract

When Congress was debating the Medicare drug benefit in 2003, there were many who advocated that Medicare provide the benefit as part of the traditional hospital insurance program. This was expected to save money both due to lower administrative costs and also as result of Medicare’s ability to use its market power to directly negotiate lower prices with the pharmaceutical industry. The plan that was passed instead required beneficiaries to purchase insurance from private insurers who would be subsidized by the government. It has been widely noted that the drug benefit has cost considerably less than expected. In 2011, the benefit cost $67.4 billion, just 51.3 percent of the originally projected cost. While advocates of using private insurers have claimed that lower-than-projected costs vindicate their design for the benefit, in fact the main reason that costs have been less than projected is that drug costs in general have risen much less rapidly than had been projected. This issue brief looks at the main factor behind slower-than-projected costs and how the United States can lower spending by negotiating drug prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Dean Baker, 2013. "Reducing Waste With an Efficient Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2013-05, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
  • Handle: RePEc:epo:papers:2013-05
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    File URL: http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/medicare-drug-2012-12.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Moreno Gigi & van Eijndhoven Emma & Benner Jennifer & Sullivan Jeffrey, 2017. "The Long-Term Impact of Price Controls in Medicare Part D," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-56, December.
    2. Taruja Karmarkar & Antonio J. Trujillo & William Padula & Jeremy Greene & G. Caleb Alexander & Gerard Anderson, 2020. "Fairness in the trade-off between drug price regulation and investments in research and development: A survey of economists," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 4(1), pages 49-55, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Medicare; medicare drug benefit; prescription drug; Dean Baker; hospital insurance; pharmaceutical industry; private insurers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I - Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • H - Public Economics

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