Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election Campaigns
AbstractThis report finds a steep rise in illegal firings of pro-union workers in the 2000s relative to the last half of the 1990s. It uses published data from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to update an index of the probability that a pro-union worker will be fired in the course of a union election campaign. By 2005, pro-union workers involved in union election campaigns faced about a 1.8 percent chance of being illegally fired during the course of the campaign. If we assume that employers target union organizers and activists, and that union organizers and activists make up about 10 percent of pro-union workers, our estimates suggest that almost one-in-five union organizers or activists can expect to be fired as a result of their activities in a union election campaign.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in its series CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs with number 2007-01.
Date of creation: Jan 2007
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
- J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
- J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-04-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAB-2007-04-09 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-04-09 (Law & Economics)
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