Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Institution Building and Change in China

Contents:

Author Info

  • Krug, B.
  • Hendrischke, H.

Abstract

We advance a conceptual frame for explaining economic transformation in China that combines a dynamic and a comparative perspective by taking the analysis of Fiscal Federalism one step further. Using insights from the comparative business systems literature we show that devolution of power at the beginning of the reform process introduced local autonomy, which stimulated a diversity of local regulatory regimes. As the central political leadership is no longer the sole supplier of institutional change, local governments become equal contributors to the formation of local business systems. Yet, local governments only partially define emerging local business systems. Local governance at the enterprise level is defined by the interaction between political and economic entrepreneurship, or, phrased in institutional terms, local business systems emerge from the interplay between the formal architecture of local autonomy and the informal institution of networking. In a comparative perspective this interaction, and its underlying driving forces for co-operation, namely: procedural uncertainty, relational risk and institutional change, will lead to diversity in outcomes. In a dynamic perspective both market competition and networking will ensure further competition between business systems, while political unification, imitation or scale economies will ask for convergence of local business systems beyond the local nexus.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://repub.eur.nl/pub/7331/ERS%202006%20008%20ORG.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam in its series ERIM Report Series Research in Management with number ERS-2006-008-ORG.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 06 Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:7331

Contact details of provider:
Postal: RSM Erasmus University & Erasmus School of Economics, PoBox 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam
Phone: 31-10-408 1182
Fax: 31-10-408 9020
Email:
Web page: http://www.erim.eur.nl/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: China; Institution Building; Institutional Change; Transition Economy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. D. Stark, 1996. "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 6.
  2. Peter Ping Li, 2005. "The Puzzle of China's Township¥VVillage Enterprises: The Paradox of Local Corporatism in a Dual-Track Economic Transition," Management and Organization Review, International Association of Chinese Management Research, vol. 1(2), pages 197-224, July.
  3. Victor Nee & Yang Cao, 2004. "Market Transition and the Firm: Institutional Change and Income Inequality in Urban China," Management and Organization Review, International Association of Chinese Management Research, vol. 1(1), pages 23-56, June.
  4. Xu, Xinpeng, 2002. "Have the Chinese provinces become integrated under reform?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 116-133.
  5. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  6. Krug, B. & Hendrischke, H., 2001. "The Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2001-03-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni.
  7. Barbara Krug, 2002. "Norms, Numbers and Hierarchy: Commenton E. Schlicht," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 555-561, 04.
  8. J�nos Kornai & Eric Maskin & G�rard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
  9. Joel Hellman & Mark Schankerman, 2000. "Intervention, corruption and capture: the nexus between enterprises and the state," Working Papers 58, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November.
  11. Alesina, Alberto, 2003. "The Size of Countries: Does it Matter?," Scholarly Articles 4551794, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
  13. Y. Xu, 2000. "Forecasting Labor Supply in Urban China: Integrating Demographic Dynamics and Socioeconomic Transition," Working Papers ir00011, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
  14. Victor Nee, 2000. "The Role of the State in Making a Market Economy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(1), pages 64-, March.
  15. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "The Efficiency of Investment in the Presence of Aggregate Demand Spillovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1221-31, December.
  16. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Bowles, Paul & Ho, Samuel P. S., 2002. "The Determinants of Employee Ownership in China's Privatized Rural Industry: Evidence from Jiangsu and Shandong," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 415-437, June.
  17. Krug, B. & Zhu, Z. & Hendrischke, H., 2004. "China’s emerging tax regime: Devolution, fiscal federalism, or tax farming?," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-113-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni.
  18. Oecd, 2005. "Governance of Banks in China," Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2005(2), pages 67-108.
  19. Hongbin Li & Scott Rozelle, 2003. "Privatizing Rural China: Insider Privatization, Innovative Contracts, and the Performance of Township Enterprises1," Discussion Papers 00001, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.
  20. Joel Hellman & Mark Schankerman, 2000. "Intervention, Corruption and Capture: The Nexus between Enterprises and the State," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(3), pages 545-576, November.
  21. Barbara Krug, 1999. "On Custom in Economics: The Case of Humanism and Trade Regimes," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(3), pages 405-, September.
  22. Smyth, Russell & Inder, Brett, 2004. "Is Chinese provincial real GDP per capita nonstationary?: Evidence from multiple trend break unit root tests," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-24.
  23. Paul M Romer, 1999. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2232, David K. Levine.
  24. Elissa Braunstein & Gerald Epstein, 2002. "Bargaining Power and Foreign Direct Investment in China: Can 1.3 Billion Consumers Tame the Multinationals?," SCEPA working paper series. SCEPA's main areas of research are macroeconomic policy, inequality and poverty, and globalization. 2002-13, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
  25. Litwack, John M., 2002. "Central Control of Regional Budgets: Theory with Applications to Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 51-75, March.
  26. World Bank, 2002. "China - National Development and Sub-National Finance : A Review of Provincial Expenditures," World Bank Other Operational Studies 15423, The World Bank.
  27. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1986. "Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S401-26, October.
  28. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change
    [Understanding the Process of Economic Change]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  29. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May.
  30. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 7828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1991. "Economic Perspectives on Privatization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-132, Spring.
  32. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
  33. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor'S Edge: Distortions And Incremental Reform In The People'S Republic Of China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1091-1135, November.
  34. Xiao-yuan Dong & Louis Putterman & Bulent Unel, 2004. "Enterprise Restructuring and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Rural and Urban Enterprises in Jiangsu Province," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-668, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:7331. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePub).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.