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Protected by the family? How closely-held family firms protect minority shareholders

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  • PABLO MARTIN

    ()
    (Instituto de Empresa)

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    Abstract

    Most companies in the world are owned by families, and a majority of them are registered in countries where the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak. Is family control the consequence of the lack of investor protection? It is known that agency problems among owners actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of minority investors. In this article we analyze successful strategies used by Canadian and Latin American business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction of their minority shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling shareholders to abuse them.

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    File URL: http://latienda.ie.edu/working_papers_economia/WPE06-02.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment in its series Working Papers Economia with number wpe06-02.

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    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:emp:wpaper:wpe06-02

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    Keywords: Corporate governance; Family firms; Investor protection;

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    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Family Firms," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1944, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
      • Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2000. "Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 1-33, 02.
    4. Randall K. Morck, 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc00-1, octubre-d.
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