Most companies in the world are owned by families, and a majority of them are registered in countries where the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak. Is family control the consequence of the lack of investor protection? It is known that agency problems among owners actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of minority investors. In this article we analyze successful strategies used by Canadian and Latin American business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction of their minority shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling shareholders to abuse them.
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Paper provided by Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment in its series Working Papers Economia with number
wpe06-02.