Dynamic Multiactivity Contests
AbstractIn many contests, players can influence the outcome through efforts in multiple activities, several of which can be chosen before others. In this paper, we develop a model of dynamic multiactivity contests. Players simultaneously choose efforts in long-run activities, observe each other's efforts in these activities, and then simultaneously choose efforts in short-run activities. A player's long-run and short-run efforts complement each other in determining the player's probability of winning. We compare the outcomes of this two-stage model to those of the corresponding model in which players do not observe each other's first-stage efforts before the second stage and thus effectively choose efforts in all activities simultaneously. Interestingly, effort expenditures are always lower in the sequential multi-activity contest than in the simultaneous multi-activity contest. The implications of this result for the organization of military, litigation, innovation, academic, and sporting contests are highlighted.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) in its series Emory Economics with number 1005.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006.
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1187, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-Battle Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 5645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 122, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
- Flavio Cunha & James J. Heckman & Susanne M. Schennach, 2010.
"Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 883-931, 05.
- Flavio Cunha & James Heckman & Susanne Schennach, 2010. "Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation," NBER Working Papers 15664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susanne Schennach & James Heckman & Flavio Cunha, 2007. "Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation," 2007 Meeting Papers 973, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Flavio Cunha & James Heckman & Susanne Schennach, 2010. "Estimating the technology of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation," CeMMAP working papers CWP09/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Cunha, Flavio & Heckman, James J. & Schennach, Susanne, 2010. "Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 4702, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Qiang Fu & JingFeng Lu, 2007.
"The Optimal Multi-Stage Contest,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
- James Heckman & Flavio Cunha, 2007.
"The Technology of Skill Formation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 31-47, May.
- James Heckman & Pedro Carneiro & Flavio Cunha, 2004. "The Technology of Skill Formation," 2004 Meeting Papers 681, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Cunha, Flavio & Heckman, James J., 2007. "The Technology of Skill Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 2550, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Flavio Cunha & James Heckman, 2007. "The Technology of Skill Formation," NBER Working Papers 12840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pamela Schmitt & Robert Shupp & Kurtis Swope & John Cadigan, 2004.
"Multi-period rent-seeking contests with carryover: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 187-211, November.
- John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Kurtis Swope & Robert Shupp, 2004. "Multi-Period Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryover: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Departmental Working Papers 5, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-62, March.
- Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
- Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 81-89, 04.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2009.
"Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests,"
49884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 731-747, March.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests," Working Papers 09-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Rick Harbaugh & Tilman Klumpp, 2005.
"Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 316-329, April.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
- Sanghack Lee, 2001. "Two-Stage Contests With Additive Carryovers," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 83-99.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. " Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-96, June.
- João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Steven B. Caudill & Samantha J. Wineke, 2014. "Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 116-126, May.
- Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sue Mialon).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.