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Does Opportunism Pay Off? A Study of Vote Functions and Policy Preferences

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Stefan Krause ()
Fabio Mendez

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Abstract

We present an empirical study of voting behavior to analyze the impact of opportunism; that is, whenever political incumbents implement economic policies strategically and in connection with general elections in order to gain votes. We derive a measure for opportunism that is isolated from the impact of aggregate economic conditions, such as the levels of economic growth and consumer price inflation. In contrast with most papers available on these issues, we do not ask whether political parties behave opportunistically; instead, we ask whether they receive a direct, electoral punishment or incentive for doing so. Our results indicate that the electorate punishes an incumbent party for behaving opportunistically, controlling for economic conditions and political variables. The party in power receives a significantly lower percentage of votes whenever it follows expansionary policies during the election year, relative to the other years of its tenure.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) in its series Emory Economics with number 0604.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:emo:wp2003:0604

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  1. Stefan Krause, 2006. "Optimal monetary policy and the equivalency between the one-period AD--AS model and the forward-looking New Keynesian model," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(9), pages 541-544, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, 2003. "Policy Makers' Preferences, Party Ideology and the Political Business Cycle," Emory Economics 0319, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989-2), pages 1-68. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 2003. " Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 763-85, October.
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  8. Castro, Vitor & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2004. "Political business cycles and inflation stabilization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 1-6, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Jon Faust & John Irons, 1996. "Money, politics and the post-war business cycle," International Finance Discussion Papers 572, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  10. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, 2005. "Institutions, Arrangements, and Preferences for Inflation Stability: Evidence and Lessons from a Panel Data Analysis," Emory Economics 0501, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
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