Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, and Unobservable Technology
AbstractConsumers often boycott imported goods because they do not approve the way they are manufactured; e.g., using child labor or causing dolphin deaths. Without independent oversight firms must first resist the temptation to employ such modes of production and still convince consumers that they do not employ them. This paper develops a model in which a foreign monopolist uses the price to signal his technology choice in the presence of such moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We find that boycotts and indiscriminate tariffs are effective in addressing consumer concerns, but mandatory labeling of the products is not.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) in its series Emory Economics with number 0417.
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Kaz Miyagiwa, 2009. "Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, And Unobservable Technology," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 883-902, 08.
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-02 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas J. Prusa & Dobrin Kolev, 1999.
"Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness Of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information,"
Departmental Working Papers
199901, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 2002. "Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy under Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 895-918, August.
- Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 6986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tomomichi Mizuno & Kazuhiro Takauchi & Takeshi Iida, 2011. "Better technology may be sold for a lower fee: The ad valorem tariff and licensing contract," Discussion Papers 1109, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
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