Capital structures and compensation policies
AbstractWe study the interations between leverage, employment structure and compensation policies within firms. Recent works have shown that there exists heterogeneity in compensation policies across firms (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999 and Margolis, 1996). We introduce firms' capital structure in order to explain part of this heterogeneity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 99-28.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Dachraoui, K. & Dionne, G., 1999. "Capital Structures and Compensation Policies," Papers 99-28, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Dachraoui, K. & Dionne, G., 1999. "Capital Structure and Compensation Policies," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 99-03, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2001-10-29 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2001-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2001-11-01 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FIN-2001-10-29 (Finance)
- NEP-LAB-2001-10-29 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2001-10-29 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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