Fixed agenda social choice correspondences
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondence under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity, ...). It is well know in the literature that, under some of theses assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven ( and ); but no information about the social choice set is obtained. We now establish a relationship between the social choice set and the individual maximal sets which explicitly describes a fixed agenda social choice correspondence that satisfies theses rationality assumptions. Some of the results in  about the explicit representation of social decision functions are then translated and reinterpreted in the fixed agenda framework.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 98-11.
Date of creation: 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Mª Carmen Sánchez, 1998. "- Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Peris, J.E. & Sanchez, M.C., 1998. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Papers 9811, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Vincenzo Denicolo, 1989.
"Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions,"
84, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
- Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
- Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1987. "Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 311-314.
- Moulin,Hervi, 1991. "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424585, November.
- Aleskerov, Fuad, 1992. "Relational-Functional Voting Operations," Working Papers 818, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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