Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms
AbstractWe model the trading possibilities of one seller and n potential buyers as a strategic game, which extends the two-person sealed-bid double auction. We introduce particular communication equilibria for this game, the self-fulfilling equilibria. In the case of arbitrary informational externalities, we show that self-fulfilling equilibria are euqivalent to veto-incentive compatible mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 98-10.
Date of creation: 1998
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- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2006.
"Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types,"
321307000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2013.
"Auction Design Without Commitment,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, 04.
- Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
- Stefano Galavotti & Nozomu Muto & Daisuke Oyama, 2011. "On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 87-123, September.
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