This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification)

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Frederic Koessler () (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
Francoise Forges () (CEREMADE, Paris-Dauphine University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Nous présentons une synthèse des principaux modèles de transmission stratégique de l'information. Dans une première partie, nous étudions les jeux dits de "cheap-talk", c'est-à-dire les jeux de communication directe dans lesquels les messages sont gratuits et non vérifiables. Nous analysons ensuite les jeux dits de "persuasion", dans lesquels les joueurs sont capables de certifier leurs informations. Dans la dernière partie, nous montrons dans différents cadres comment plusieurs étapes de communication bilatérales et la certification retardée de l'information permettent d'étendre de manière significative l'ensemble des résultats d'équilibre, même si un seul individu détient des informations privées. L'article propose des caractérisations géométriques des équilibres, de nombreux exemples et des applications. (This paper surveys the main models of strategic information transmission. First, we study cheap talk games, i.e., direct communication games in which messages are costless and unverifiable. Then, we analyze persuasion games, in which players' information is certifiable. Finally, we show in various settings how multiple stages of bilateral communication and delayed information certification may significantly expand the set of equilibrium outcomes, even if only one individual is privately informed. Several geometric equilibrium characterizations, examples and applications are examined along the paper.)

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/2006-04.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2006-04.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Email:
Web page: http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Lise Patureau).

Related research
Keywords: cheap talk certification credibility incomplete information information transmission jointly controlled lotteries verifiable types

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.