Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods
AbstractWe use a donor-provider-agent framework to study the delivery of developmental goods (i.e. aid, credit, technology transfer to poor). The need to provide incentives for the intermediate provider has been a key issue in the recent academic as well as non-academic discourses. We show that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communications between the provider and the agents. We study the interplay between incentives and communication failure in the presence of motivated providers who derive benefits from helping the disadvantaged.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bath, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 22126.
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
developmental goods; communication; incentives; motivated provider;
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