Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Wighted Welfare and Price Competition
AbstractIn this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (wighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weigth given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also anlyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer suspluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2011-46.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Other versions of this item:
- Juan Carlos Bárcena‐Ruiz & Máximo Sedano, 2011. "Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly: Weighted Welfare And Price Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 485-503, December.
- L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-02-12 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-02-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-02-12 (Industrial Organization)
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