Monotonic core solutions: Beyond Young's theorem
AbstractWe introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-valued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the second property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2010-44.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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