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On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

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Author Info
Javier Arin () (UPV/EHU)
V. Feltkamp (Maastricht Sholl of Management)

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Abstract

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted version of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we shoe that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 200728.

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Date of creation: 22 Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200728

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Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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Related research
Keywords: Monotonicity; Corem; TU games; nucleolus per capita;

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