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Internal Organization of Firms and Cartel Formation

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  • Kuipers, Jerome
  • Olaizola Ortega, María Norma

Abstract

We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several desirable poperties and is the only known solution that satisfies core stability, strong aggegate monotonicity and null player out property in the class of balanced games. The SD-prenucleolus is the only known solution that satisfies core stability continuity and is monotonic in the class of veto balanced games.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2004-15.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200415

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Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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Keywords: absorbing sets solution; cartels; stability; strategic delegation;

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  1. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  2. Elena Inarra & Jeroen Kuipers & N. Olaizola, 2005. "Absorbing and generalized stable sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 433-437, 06.
  3. Javier M. López Cuñat & Miguel González-Maestre, 1999. "- Delegation And Mergers In Oligopoly," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Ramon Fauli-Oller & Massimo Motta, 1996. "Managerial Incentives for Takeovers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 497-514, December.
  6. Sylvie Thoron, 1998. "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 63-76, February.
  7. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
  8. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  9. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
  10. Olaizola Ortega, María Norma & Kuipers, Jerome & Iñarra García, María Elena, 2001. "Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems," BILTOKI 2002-01, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística).
  11. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  12. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
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