Internal Organization of Firms and Cartel Formation
AbstractWe introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several desirable poperties and is the only known solution that satisfies core stability, strong aggegate monotonicity and null player out property in the class of balanced games. The SD-prenucleolus is the only known solution that satisfies core stability continuity and is monotonic in the class of veto balanced games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2004-15.
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-11-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-11-21 (Industrial Competition)
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