Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation
AbstractThis work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 2004-12.
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Other versions of this item:
- Juan Carlos B�Rcena-Ruiz & Norma Olaizola, 2006. "Cost-Saving Production Technologies And Strategic Delegation ," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 141-157, 06.
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Olaizola, Norma, 2008.
"Choice of flexible production technologies under strategic delegation,"
Japan and the World Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 395-414, August.
- Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Olaizola Ortega, María Norma, 2004. "Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation," IKERLANAK 2004-13, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2011. "Cross-ownership and stability in a Cournot duopoly," MPRA Paper 34574, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: when profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Discussion Papers 2011/128, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Welfare effects of cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly," Discussion Papers 2011/125, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Product differentiation and duopoly: when social welfare benefits from cross-shareholding," Discussion Papers 2011/129, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alcira Macías Redondo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.