Do experimental subjects favor their friends?
Abstract
Ideally we would like subjects of experiments to be perfect strangers so that the situation they face at the lab is not just part of a long run interaction. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach those conditions and experimenters try to mitigate any effects from those out-of-the-lab relationships by, for instance, randomly matching subjects. However, even if this type of procedure is used, there is a positive probability that a subject may face a friend or an acquaintance. We find evidence that social proximity between subjects is irrelevant to experiment results in dictator games. Thus, although ideal conditions are not met, relations between subjects do not contaminate the results of experiments.Download Info
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Paper provided by University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II in its series DFAEII Working Papers with number 2005-12.Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200512
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Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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Related research
Keywords: friendship effect; dictator game; experimental procedures; fairness;Other versions of this item:
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Miguel Angel Durán & María Paz Espinosa, 2005. "Do experimental subjects favor their friends?," ThE Papers 05/14, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pablo Brañas Garza, 2003.
"Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2003/50, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Branas-Garza, Pablo, 2006. "Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 306-320, July.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza, 2003. "Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity," IESA Working Papers Series 0303, Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research.
- Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick & Elena Katok, 1998. "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 269-299.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez & Giovanni Ponti, 2005. "An experimental device to elicit social networks," ThE Papers 05/19, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Frank, Bjorn, 1998. "Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 171-174, November.
- Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Pablo Brañas-Garza, 2006.
"Promoting Helping Behavior with Framing in Dictator games,"
ThE Papers
06/04, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Branas-Garza, Pablo, 2007. "Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 477-486, August.
- Brañas Garza, Pablo & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2006.
"Altruism with Social Roots: An Emerging Literature,"
DFAEII Working Papers
2006-07, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Brañas–Garza Pablo & María Paz Espinosa, 2006. "Altruism with Social Roots: An Emerging Literature," REVISTA DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & María Paz Espinosa, 2006. "Altruism with Social Roots: an Emerging Literature," ThE Papers 06/05, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Durán, Miguel A. & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Brañas Garza, Pablo, 2005.
"The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: A classroom experiment,"
DFAEII Working Papers
2005-14, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Miguel Angel Durán & María Paz Espinosa, 2005. "The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation," ThE Papers 05/21, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez, 2007. "The dark side of friendship: envy," ThE Papers 07/07, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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