Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market
AbstractThis paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II in its series DFAEII Working Papers with number 2005-07.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-03-13 (Business Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-03-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2005-03-13 (Labour Economics)
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