Joel Sandonís () (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Spain) Ramon Faulí-Oller () (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Alicante, Spain)
Abstract
The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable (two-part tariff) contracts. The result does not hold however, whenever any of the three assumptions is relaxed. In this paper we show first, that in presence of an alternative supply, vertical integration is profitable and leads to anticompetitive market foreclosure; second, under product differentiation, inefficient alternative supplies make vertical integration welfare improving, whereas it is profitable only for\ efficient enough second source supplies. As a consequence, a clear prescription for antitrust emerges: we should not allow for vertical integration.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística) in its series BILTOKI with number
200305.
Order Information: Postal: Dpto. de Econometría y Estadística, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ainhoa Zarraga).
Find related papers by JEL classification: L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: