Jesus Rubio () (Departamento de Economia Aplicada III, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Spain)
Abstract
Stewart (1994) presents a model of endogenous entry. In his article Stewart proposes the following topic for future research: "An important feature of the model is that entry would be inefficient from the producers' point of view, and therefore never occurs in equilibrium. But in practice individuals do sometimes leave to set up rivals and an obvious topic for future research is to explain why such separations occur." [p. 1792] The purpose of this article is to present an explanation to the previous question in a model where an incumbent entrepreneur and her endogenous potential entrant worker should negotiate at any production time over a finite sequence of production times unless endogenous entry occurs. In this model inefficient entry could take place in subgame perfect equilibrium. Alternative efficient paths (where both the entrepreneur and the worker obtain more) are factible but not credible.
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Paper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística) in its series BILTOKI with number
200203.
Order Information: Postal: Dpto. de Econometría y Estadística, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain Email:
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