Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present an approach and a solution for analyzing the stability of coalition structures: We define a coalitional system (a set and a binary relation on that set) that explains the transitions between coalition structures and we propose to solve these systems using the absorbing sets solution for abstract systems. Second, to perform an analysis of this approach to evidence its utility in determining the stable coalition structures for some socioeconomic problems. We find that the absorbing sets solution efficiently solves this class of coalitional systems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística) in its series BILTOKI with number 2002-01.
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Postal: Dpto. de Econometría y Estadística, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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