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No escape? The co-ordination problem in heritage preservation

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Author Info

  • Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt
  • Nancy Holman

Abstract

Conservation areas (CAs) are among the most restrictive English planning policies. Designation implies a significant limitation of owners’ control over the shape and appearance of their properties. The policy, however, can also be argued to solve a sort of ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, in which it might be collectively rationale to preserve the character of an area, but an individual homeowner may be tempted to inappropriately alter their property, thus free-riding on nearby properties’ character. The net-benefit of the policy depends largely on the existence of positive ‘heritage effects’ and acknowledgement from homeowners that policy contributes to neighbourhood stability and the preservation of these positive effects. Our results of a mixed-method analysis of close to 1 million property transactions near to about 8000 CAs and 111 interviews with residents in nine representative CAs in Greater London suggest that positive heritage externalities exist and that residents in CAs tend to value their local environments, acknowledge the need for planning control and execute their right to object to neighbour’s planning request.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53936/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 53936.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:53936

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Related research

Keywords: designation; England; heritage; property value; prisoner’s dilemma;

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  1. Gabriel Ahlfeldt, 2011. "If Alonso Was Right: Modeling Accessibility And Explaining The Residential Land Gradient," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 318-338, 05.
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Cited by:
  1. Gabriel Ahlfeldt & Kristoffer Möller & Sevrin Waights & Nicolai Wendland, 2012. "On prisoner's dilemmas and gilded cages: The economics of heritage preservation," ERSA conference papers ersa12p783, European Regional Science Association.
  2. Richter, Felix & Ahlfeldt, Gabriel & Maennig, Wolfgang, 2013. "Urban renewal after the Berlin Wall," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79789, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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