Gradual Green Tax Reforms
AbstractGreen tax reforms have become an important tool not only in protecting the environment but also in bringing about a more efficient tax system. However, reforms often imply accepting sacrifices in the short-run and bring about the risk of potential political opposition. Within this framework, the debate on whether to implement green tax reforms in one-step or gradually becomes of great interest. In this paper we use a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model to evaluate different reforms that consist in increasing energy taxes and adjusting capital taxation in a revenue-neutral framework. Our findings show that, although an environmental dividend is always granted, the efficiency dividend depends on the type of reform, its size and how gradually it is implemented. Thus, one-step reforms that produce an efficiency dividend would imply large efficiency costs in the short-run. In this case, the reform could only produce efficiency gains in the short-run if it is implemented gradually, although such gains would end up disappearing in the long-run.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics for Energy in its series Working Papers with number 04-2011.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.eforenergy.org
Green Tax Reform; General Equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2012-05-15 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-ENE-2012-05-15 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-05-15 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2012-05-15 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-05-15 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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