Credit Rationing with Heterogeneous Borrowers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Slovakia
AbstractThis paper investigates the macroeconomic importance of credit rationing and whether banks use characteristics such as ownership structure and institutional type of borrowers in order to regulate the risk of loaned funds. To test this, monthly data for 2000–2002, extracted from the National Bank of Slovakia monetary review, were used. The paper finds that credit rationing was not present during the period analysed, implying that the credit market can be approximated with a typical supply and demand relationship. The second finding of the paper is that intermediaries use the ownership type and institutional form of borrowers to regulate risk.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels in its series EERI Research Paper Series with number EERI_RP_2004_02.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Credit rationing; heterogeneous borrowers; transition countries;
Other versions of this item:
- Pavel Ciaian, 2004. "Credit rationing with heterogeneous borrowers in transition economies: evidence from Slovakia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 39-46.
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- P24 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - National Income, Product, and Expenditure; Money; Inflation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Blinder, Alan S & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983.
"Money, Credit Constraints, and Economic Activity,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 297-302, May.
- Maks Tajnikar, 2001. "Transitional Adjustment of Large Companies in Slovenia and Economic Policy," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 331-344.
- Blinder, Alan S, 1987.
"Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 327-52, June.
- Lubomir Lizal & Jan Svejnar, 2001.
"Investment, Credit Rationing and the Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence from Czech Panel Data,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
363, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Lubomír Lízal & Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Investment, Credit Rationing, And The Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence From Czech Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 353-370, May.
- Konings, Jozef & Rizov, Marian & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2003. "Investment and financial constraints in transition economies: micro evidence from Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 253-258, February.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Drakos, Konstantinos & Giannakopoulos, Nicholas, 2011. "On the determinants of credit rationing: Firm-level evidence from transition countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(8), pages 1773-1790.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julia van Hove).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.